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Theory and Evidence
ABSTRACT
This paper presents and tests a positive theory ofmonetary and fiscal
policy. The government chooses the rates of taxation and inflation to
minimize the present value of the social cost ofraising revenue given
exogenous expenditure and an intertemporal budget constraint. The theory
implies that nominal interest rates and inflation are random walks.It also
implies that nominal interest rates and inflation movetogether with tax
rates. United States data from 1952 to 1985 provide somesupport for the
theory.




Cambridge, MA 021381. Introduction
Throughout most of recent history, nominal
money growth have been highly persistent. They
revert to any normal level. Mankiw and Miron (
nominalinterest rate has been approximately
of the Federal Reserve System in 1914. Fama
(1987) report findings of rion-stationarity I
post-war period. The purpose of this paper
collection of seigniorage over time implies
approximately random walks.
Inflation isoneform of taxation. It is a tax on holding money
balances. Beyond the traditional deadweight losses of a tax, inflation also
imposes many other social costs (Fischer and Modigliani, 1978). In a
first—best world, there would be no inflation, and perhaps deflation
(Friedman, 1969). Once distortions are introduced, including the need to
raise public revenue, a positive rate of inflationmay be optimal (Phelps,
1973).
If the marginal social cost of raising revenue is increasing in thetax
rate, as one would typically expect, optimal fiscal policy entails the
smoothing of tax rates over time (Barro, 1979, 1986). Just as the smoothing
of consumption by consumers makes consumption a random walk (Hall,1978), the
smoothing of tax rates by the government aakes tax rates a random walk. This
general principle applied to the case of seigniorage implies that nominal
interest rates and inflation should be smoothed as well, and that such
smoothing makes these series approximately random walks.
interest rates, inflation, and
show little or no tendency to
1986) show that the three-month
a random walk since the founding
and Gibbons (1984) and Barsky
n the rate of inflation over the
is to show that the optimal
that these series should be—2-
The model presented here to formalize these ideas is completely
classical. In particular, monetary policy is assumed to have no effect on
output or real interest rates. The model can be interpreted in two ways.
Those readers who view economic fluctuations through the lens of real business
2.The Theory of Optimal SeignioraQe
I examine here the optimal intertemporal monetary and fiscal policy of a
government that must satisfy a budget constraint in present value. The
government budget constraint requires
(1) feG(t+s)ds+B(t)=f eT(t+s)ds
0 0
cycle theory can consider
long-run fluctuations in
who believe that monetary
temporary misperceptions
the model as applying to
and employment at the nat
After presenting the
nominal interest rate and
the model as a description of both short-run and
nominal variables. Yet there are surely many readers
policy has real short-run effects because of
or nominal rigidities. These readers can interpret
the longer run in which the economy maintains output
ural rate.
model, I examine one key implication, that the
inflation are determined by the government revenue
requirement. Using data since 1952, I find that an increase in federal
government revenue of 1 percent of GNP raises the nominal interest rate by
to 1.4 percentage points. Although there is a highly significant positive
relation between the average tax rate and the nominal interest rate, the
theory explains only one third of the variation in changes in the nominal
interest rate.
1.1-3-
where G(t) =realexpenditure at time t
T(t) =realrevenue at time t,
B(t) =realgovernment debt at time t,
p =realdiscount rate, assumed constant over time.
Expenditure is here taken to be exogenous, so as tohighlight the issue of
revenue mix. Future expenditure is a random variable; thegovernment thus
receives new information on its revenuerequirement as time passes.
The government raises revenue from twosources. The first source of
revenue is a tax on output, such as an income tax ora sales tax. The second
source of revenue is seigniorage, the printing ofnew money. Both ways of
raising revenue cause deadweight social losses. Thegovernment chooses its
use of these two instruments to minimize thepresent value of these social
losses.
Denote the exogenous level of output as V(t) and thetax rate on output
as r(t). The revenue raised by this tax is thusr(t)Y(t). The deadweight
social losses induced by the tax are denotedf(T)Y, where V >0and f" >0.
The deadweight social losses are assumedhomogeneous in output.
For the moment, suppose that the demand formoney is described by the
quantity equation:
(2) M(t)/P(t) =kY(t)
where P4(t) =outsidemoney at time t,
P(t) =theprice level at time t,
ka constant.






where =/Pis the inflation rate,
g =/Yis the growth rate of output.
Total revenue is therefore
(4) T =rY+(,r+g)kY,
the sum of the receipts from direct taxation and seigniorage.
The social cost of inflation is denoted h(n)Y, where h' >0and h" >0.
As with the cost of taxation, the cost of inflation is assumed homogeneous in
output. The nature of these inflation costs is discussed by Fischer and
Modigliani (1978). These social losses include direct costs, such as
increased menu costs. But they also include the losses associated with the
disruption of the efficient functioning of markets, as emphasized by Okun
(1975) and Carlton (1982).1
The goal of the government is to minimize the expected present value of
the social losses
(5) Etfe(f(r) +h(n)]Yds
subject to the budget constraint
(6) f'e'G ds +B(t)=f°°e'(r+irk+gk}vds
where some timeargumentsare omitted to simplify the notation. The two
choice variables of the government are the tax rate r and the inflation rate
2-5-.
As in much recent work studying dynamic optimization(e.g., Hall, 1978;
Hansen and Singleton, 1982; Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers,1985), I do not
solve for the decision rule but rather examine the first-orderconditions





























The optimal fiscal and monetary policy satisfies these threeequations.The
in the future. It expresses the "tax smoothing" ofoptimal
tigated by Barro (1979, 1986). The intertemporal first-
equates the marginal social cost of inflation today and in
atic first-order condition (9) equatescontemporaneously
cost of raising revenue through direct taxation and the
t of raising revenue through seigniorage.
mplies that the marginal cost of
implies that the marginal cost of nfl
)andh(.) are quadratic, then the tax
themselves martingales. Since the real
the nominal interest rate is a martingale
which relates the tax rate to the rate o
implication of the theory. An increase
increases the use of both instruments.




The theory as developed so far assumes that real balances do not respond
to the level of inflation. More generally, one could make k a function of the








where qI(IT) •h'(n)/[k(,r)+ (IT+p
roughly the same interpretation
feedback from inflation to real
theoretical implications.
There are at least two
address. First, I have not
(1986) suggest that explicit modeling of money as an intermediate good can
overturn the traditional conclusion that the inflation tax should be used in a
second-best world. Yet Romer (1985) presents a model of the transactions
)k'(n)]. These first-order conditions have
as in the basic model. Hence, introducing
balances has little effect on the fundamental
issues that the theory presented here does not
explained the mechanics of how the monetary
authority achieves
is sometimes argued




process and the role
It its target for inflation and the nominal interest
that such a target cannot be permanently maintai
o indeterminacy of the price level. Recent work














process in which use of the inflation tax is appropriate. Moreover, as Barro
(1987) points out, the inflation tax may be the onlyway of taxing economic
activity in the underground economy. The precise circumstances under which
use of the inflation tax is second-best optimal remain an unsettled issue.
3. Evidence
The theory of optimal seigniorage can be interpretedas prescriptive. As
such, the theory is common. For example, Tobin (1986,p. 11) writes,
The ability of the government to finance expendituresby issuing
money is the "seigniorage" associated with its sovereign monetary
monopoly. Both explicit and implicit taxes are distortionary. The
distortion of the inflation tax is the diversion ofresources or
loss of utility associated with the scarcity ofmoney, already
mentioned. But there are also distortions in explicittaxes;
lump-sum taxes are not available. The problem is to optimize the
choice of taxes, given the necessity of governmentexpenditure.
This formulation correctly connects the money-supplyprocess to the
government budget. (Emphasis added.)
This sort of theory is thus often recommended for the conductof monetary
policy.
It is natural to ask whether the government (including themonetary
authority) heeds these recommendations. In other words, can thetheory of
optimal seigniorage be interpreted as at all descriptive? As Ipointed out in
the introduction, the data confirm the implication ofequation (8) that
inflation and nominal interest rates are highly persistent. Thisprediction,
however, is probably not unique to this theory and thusmay not provide a
powerful test.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the theory of optimalseigniorage
is that money growth, inflation, and nominal interest ratesare determined by-8-
the government revenue requirement. In this section, therefore, I examine
this prediction of the theory. If one could obtain reliable estimates of the
marginal social cost of inflation, the marginal social cost of direct
taxation, and the interest elasticity of money demand, then equation (9')
could be used to relate the level of taxation to the levels of inflation and
the nominal interest rate at any given point in time. Not knowing of such
reliable estimates, however, I undertake a more modest test of the theory.
estimate a linear approximation to equation (9') using United States time
series data. The goal is to test the implication of the theory that over time
higher tax rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal
interest rates.
In its purest form, as presented in Section II, the theory of optimal
seigniorage implies that the revenue requirement is the sole determinant of
inflation and nominal interest rates. That is, the static first—order
condition, equation (9'), holds without any error. In practice, of course,
the tax on real money balances depends on a variety of economic and political
forces, as does the tax on gasoline, cigarettes, or any other commodity.
Nonetheless, if the theory of optimal seignorage is useful as a positive
theory, increases in the government revenue requirement should tend to
increase the tax on real money balances.
The first nominal variable I examine is the nominal three-month Treasury
bill rate (INT). As a measure of the average tax rate, I use federal
government receipts as a percentage of GNP (TAX). Table 1 presents these
series annually between 1951 (the year of the Accord between the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury) and 1985 (the most recent year available).3Table 1 shows an upward drift
this thirty-five year period. Whi
they provide only weak evidence.
the regressions I report either
form.
in both the interest rate and revenue over
le these trends are consistent with theory,
To abstract from this secular change, all
include a time trend or are indifferenced
3.1 Basic Results
The regression of the Treasury bill rate (INT) on the federal revenue
percent of GNP (TAX) and a time trend (TIME) for 1952 to 1985 yields (with




The coefficient on TAX appears large. It implies that an increase in federal
revenue of one percent of GNP is associated with a 1.43 percentage point
increase in the nominal interest rate.4
The small Ourbin-Watson statistic prevents any valid inference from
regression (10) regarding statistical significance.I present two remedies
for serial correlation. First, I quasi-difference the equation, applying the
filter (1-0.5L), which is indicated by the Durbin-Watson in regression (10).

















D.W. =0.98 s.e.e.= 1.27- 10—
The Durbin-Watson statistic no longer indicates statistically significant
serial correlation. The coefficient on TAX is only a little smaller. The
impact of federal revenue on the nominal interest rate appears positive,
substantial, and statistically significant.
As Granger and Newbold (1974) and Plosser and Schwert (1978) emphasize,
the problem of spurious regression can be severe when the variables in a
regression are random walks. In our case, the variables are approximately
random walks both in theory and in practice. To ensure that the relation




N =34 =0.31 D.W. =1.82 s.e.c. =1.22
The relation between INT and TAX remains significant. An increase in federal
revenue of one percent of GNP increases the nominal interest rate by 1.13
percentage points. Changes in the average tax rate explain 31 percent of
changes in the nominal interest rate.7
3.2 Subsample Stability
To investigate how robust is the relation between .the nominal interest
rate and the average tax rate, I split the sample evenly into two subsamples.
The second period, 1969-1985, is different from the first period, 1952-1968,
in many ways. In approximately 1969, the economy entered a period that is
widely noted for increased macroeconomic volatility, frequent supply shocks, a
slowdown of productivity, and the breakdown of many empirical macroeconomic
relationships.—11—
The regression of INT on TAX estimated in differenced formwith data from
1952 to 1968 yields:
(13) MNT =0.2+0.72ATAX
(0.1) (0.20)
N =17 R2 =0.43 D.W. =2.46 s.e.e. =0.59
The 1969 to 1985 subsample yields
(14) AINT =0.1+1.52TAX
(0.4) (0.52)
N =172 =0.32 D.W. =1.96 s.e.c. =1.62
In both subsamples, there is a significant positive relationbetween INT and
TAX.
While the sign of the relation is the same in bothsubsamples, the
coefficient estimate is very different. In particular, thecoefficient is
twice as large in the second subsample. This increase in thecoefficient may
be evidence against the linear specification. Alog-linear specification
yields for the entire 1952 to 1985 sample:
(15) log(INT) =0.04+5.1Alog(TAX)
(0.04) (1.0)
N =342 =0.42 D.W. =2.32 s.e.c. =0.23
For the 1952 to 1968 subsample:
(16) £log(INT) =0.07+6.4Alog(TAX)
(0.06) (1.5)
N =172 =0.52 D.W. =2.07 s.e.e. =0.25
For the 1969 to 1985 subsample:—12—
(17) log(INT) =0.02+3.78log(TAx)
(0.05) (1.4)
N =17 =0.28 D.W. =2.01 s.e.e. =0.22
With this log-linear specification, the coefficient falls from the firstto
the second subsample. Hence, this functional formappears to overcompensate
for the non-linearity.
3.3 Alternative Hypotheses
The results presented so far indicate there is a significantpositive
relation between the average tax rate and the nominal interestrate.It is
possible that this correlation is proxying for some other ositted variable.
In this section I consider whether the addition of other variableschanges the
apparent relation between INT and TAX.
One alternative hypothesis is that deficits tend to induce monetization.
Under this view, higher tax receipts should, holding constantexpenditure,
lower money growth, inflation, and nominal interest rates. Totest this view,
I include federal government expenditure as a fraction of GNP(EXP) in this
equation. This alternative view predicts that once EXP is included, thesign
on TAXshouldbe negative. The theory of optimal seigniorage (equation9)
implies that current expenditure should play no independent role and that its
inclusion should not affect the TAX coefficient.
Another alternative hypothesis is that interest rates andreceipts
passively respond to the business cycle. To examine whether the correlations
I find are merely business cycle phenomena withoutany additional structural
interpretation, I include the rate of unemployment (RU) as an additional
regressor.variables are included in the regression for the entire
the results for the specification in levels are:
(18) INT =-28.9+0.18TIME +1.75TAX
(6.9) (0.05) (0.40)































In all three specifications, neither the expenditure variable nor the
unemployment rate appears significant. Moreover, the relation between the
interest rate and the average tax rate remains positive and strong.
Another hypothesis that relates the tax rate to inflation and nominal
interest rates is "bracket creep:" to the extent that a progressive tax system
is not indexed, inflation tends to cause tax rates to rise. This hypothesis,
however, cannot easily explain the phenomenon reported here. Bracket creep
relates the tax rate to the price level, not to the inflation rate. A period









rates under the bracket creep hypothesis, but decreases in tax rates under the
theory of optimal seigniorage. Since the rate of inflation is positive
throughout the sample period, the bracket creep hypothesis predicts constantly
rising tax rates. In contrast, the theory of optimal seigniorage is
consistent with the disinflationary periods, such as from 1981 to 1983, in
which the tax rate fell with inflation and the nominal interest rate.
3.4 ReQressiOnS for Inflation
The theory presented here in principle applies to both inflation and
nominal interest rates. Nominal interest rates, however, have theadvantage
of being measured accurately and with little conceptual ambiguity.Moreover,
inflation depends on a variety of transitory forces that arebeyond the
control of policymakers and outside the theory of optimal seigniorage.
Despite these reservations, I also examine whether a higheraverage tax rate
is associated with higher inflation.
The measure of inflation I use is the percentage change in the CPI(all
urban consumers) from December to December (INF). The regression of INFon
TAX yields:
(21) INF =—33.1+0.14TIME +1.80TAX
(11.4> (0.06) (0.64)
N =34 2 =0.54 D.W. =0.67 s.e.e. =2.45
The estimates imply that a 1 percent increase in receiptsas a fraction of GNP
raises inflation by 1.80 percentage points. This estimate isvery close to
the 1.43 estimate from the nominal interest rate regression.
As before, I use two corrections for serial correlation. Quasi—
differencing yields:—15•
(22) (1—O.5L)INF =-13.7+0.08TIME +1.48(1-0.SL)TAX
(5.0) (0.04) (0.56)




N =34 =0.19 D.W. =1.45 s.e.e. =2.13
The estimates here of 1.48 and 1.44 are very similar to the estimates of 1.25
and 1.13 obtained with nominal interest rates. The fit of these equations is
somewhat worse, as indicated by either the adjusted R2 or the standard errors
of estimate. This reduction in fit is to be expected, since inflation is a
"noisier" time series.
3.5 An Alternative Tax Measure
The regressions reported above relate the nominal interest rate and
inflation to federal government receipts as a percent of GNP. An alternative
tax measure is the average marginal tax rate on labor income (including social
security) as estimated by Barro and Sahasakul (1983).I therefore now examine
whether this average marginal tax rate (MAR) also positively covaries with the
nominal interest rate and inflation.8
It is not clear a priori which of the two tax measures, TAXorMAR, is
preferable. One might argue that the average marginal tax rate is the best
measure of the marginal social cost of raising revenue. Vet consider what
makes these two variables different.9 Changes in the mix of taxes, such as a
shift between personal and corporate taxes, would change MAR without changing-16—
TAX.It is not Obvious whether such a change in the tax mix shouldbe
associated with a change in the reliance on seigniorage asa source of
revenue. Resolving this issue requires a model more extensive than that
presented here.
The variable MAR is available up to 1983, so thesample here is two years
shorter. Regressing the change in the nominal interestrate on the change in
MAR yields:
(24) AINT =0.1+ 0.50 MAR
(0.2) (0.16)
N =32 =0.22 OW. =1.80 s.e.e. =1.29
The relation between inflation and theaverage marginal tax rate iS:
(25) MNF =-0.2+ 0.34 AMAR
(0.4) (0.30)
N =32 2 =0.01 D.W. = 1.45 s.e.e. =2.43
The average marginal tax rate is positively related to boththe nominal
interest rate and inflation, but only the relation to thenominal interest
rate is statistically significant.
4.Conclusion
It is well-known that fiscal considerations are important for
understanding the money creation leading to many hyperinflatjons(Sargent,
1982; Dornbusch and Fischer, 1986).I have suggested in this paper that
fiscal considerations may be important also forunderstanding less extreme
fluctuations in nominal variables. The theory ofoptimal seigniorage can—17—
explain the non—stationary behavior of nominal interest rates and inflation.
theory also explains the empirical
nominal interest rates and inflat
ipts as a percent of GNP.1°
The conservative economic ideology
nment, lower taxes, and less inflat
to larger government, higher taxes
These combinations of monetary
ion positively covary with government
is usuallythought to embrace smaller
ion, whilethe liberal ideology is
and moreinflationist monetary
and fiscalpolicies
predicted by the theory of optimal seigniorage. Seen in this light, it is
perhaps less surprising that these combinations of policies alsoappear in
United States time series data.
There are a variety of avenues open for future research. Onemight relax
the assumption maintained here that the real interest rate isconstant. This
extension would require specifying whether high inflation rates orhigh
nominal interest rates are socially costly. "Menu" costs point towardmaking
inflation costly, while the "shoeleather" costs associated withtrips to the
bank point toward making positive nominal interest rates costly.
Future research could also use cross—national data to test the theory of
optimal seigniorage. The theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, economies
with high levels of expenditure and taxation also have high inflation and
nominal interest rates. Implementation of such a test, however, wouldlikely
require taking into account the cross-national variation in the efficacy of
the system of taxation.
Finally, it would be useful to study in more detail the government's







that the revenue requirement can explain
variation in the nominal interest rate.
explaining fluctuations in the gasoline t
clearly substantial fluctuations that the
of optimal seigniorage as presented here
fluctuations in money growth, inflation,
approximately one third of the
One could probably do no better
ax or the cigarette tax. There are
theory cannot explain. The theory
is only a partial explanation for
and nominal interest rates.-19-
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equivalent to a lump-sum tax.
non-distortionary inflation by
budget constraint and the socia
government actually chooses the
lent to choosing the rate of inf
(1975) shows that from 1952 to
rates is due to expected inflati
ation in real rates, much of the
the inflation premium. See Fama
For simplicity, this














• almost all variat
While the post-197
lation in nominal i
Gibbons 1984).
4.The theory has no prediction regarding the magnitude of thiscoefficient.
See equation (9).
5.Since the Durbin—Watson statistic is about 1.0,applying this filter is a
non-iterated Cochrane-Orcutt serial correlation correction.Iterating yields
a first-order autoregressive parameter of 0.52 with coefficient estimates
essentially unchanged.
6.While differencing may be a good way of dealing with serialcorrelation
of the error, it also emphasizes higher frequency fluctuations.To the extent
one expects a relationship to hold only in the long run,differencing may
obscure an empirical relationship. In the present application, thisproblem
does not appear serious. But it may explain why the coefficientfalls
somewhat when the data are differenced.
7.Even in the second differences the relation Is significant:-20-
=-0.03+0.90A2TAX
(0.29) (0.25)
N =34 2 =0.27 D.W. =2.44 s.e.e. =1.67
8.I am grateful to Robert Barro for providing the updated series.
9.The correlation of TAXandtMAR is 0.70.
10. My empirical results are consistent with those of Evans (1987), who
examines 18 tax cuts and 27 tax hikes enacted since 1908. Evans finds (p. 49)
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Three-Month Federal Government
Treasury Bill Receiptsas Percent
Year Rate (INT) of GNP (TAX)
1951 1.518 19.376
1952 1.723 19.255
1953 1.891 18.945
1954 0.937 17.235
1955 1.727 18.009
1956 2.628 18.333
1957 3.223 18.293
1958 1.772 17.360
1959 3.386 18.273
1960 2.883 18.805
1961 2.354 18.546
1962 2.773 18.656
1963 3.158 19.048
1964 3.547 17.882
1965 3.946 17.841
1966 4.853 18.588
1967 4.302 18.692
1968 5.333 19.816
1969 6.658 20.718
1970 6.388 19.242
1971 4.328 18.382
1972 4.072 19.146
1973 7.032 19.400
1974 7.830 19.955
1975 5.775 18.450
1976 4.974 19.077
1977 5.269 19.297
1978 7.188 19.620
1979 10.069 20.134
1980 11.434 20.271
1981 14.025 20.949
1982 10.614 20.066
1983 8.611 19.376
1984 9.523 19.296
1985 7.479 19.679